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Subjective information is a valuable resource; however, decision-
makers often ignore it because of difficulties in eliciting it from 
assessors. This thesis is on Bayesian inquiry and it presents an 
approach to eliciting subjective information from assessors. Based on 
the concepts of cascaded inference and Bayesian statistics, the approach 
is designed to reveal to the decision-maker the way in which the assessor 
considers his options and the reasons he has for selecting particular 
alternatives. Unlike previous works on cascaded inferences, the approach 
here focuses on incoherency. Specifically, it employs the use of additional 
information to revise and check the estimates. The reassessment 
may be done directly or indirectly. The indirect procedure uses 
a second order probability or type II distribution. An algorithm 
utilizing this approach is also presented. The methodology is 
applicable to any number of assessors. Procedures for aggregating 
and deriving surrogate distributions are also proposed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Subjective information is a valuable resource often ignored or 
used 1~ such a manner that its value is reduced to little or no conse-
quence; hence there is a need to develop a formal procedure for its use. 
There are many situations in which traditional and direct methods for 
obtaining information cannot be used. For example, the president of a 
large corporation cannot spend all his time examining empirical data 
such as sales, production rates, inventory figures, etc. His aides 
provide him information for decision making. Similarly, in assessing 
a political situation, a politician or statesman will rely on his own 
experiences and information from other sources. 
MAIN PURPOSE 
A Bayesian approach to inquiry makes use of empirical and subjec-
tive information. The purpose of this thesis is to mathematically 
formalize and develop an algorithm for structuring inquiry. The pro-
posed approach is based on cascading principles so that inferences may 
be derived indirectly. A feedback step utilizing additional informa-
tion is used to check and/or revise the estimates. 
2 
SUMMARY OF REMAINING CHAPTERS 
A summary of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter II 
A review of personalistic and non-personalistic interpretation of 
probability is presented. Each of the three schools of probability theory 
is briefly discussed separately. This is followed by a discussion on 
the differences between Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches to inference. 
The final section in this chapter concerns information concepts relating 
to Bayesian and non-Bayesian inquiry. 
Chapter III 
Most of the research in Bayesian information processing and infer-
ence is of recent origin. Edwards (1960) designed an optimization model 
using Bayes· theorem in a man-computer interacting mode. However, this 
approach to the use of Bayes· theorem poses many unavoidable difficul-
ties, that is, in P(HID) = P(H)P(D1H)/P(D), the requirement that D be 
measurable is difficult to fulfill in most situations. Dodson (1961) 
introduced a non-mathematical model of Bayes· theorem which circumvented 
this requirement. This model has formed the basis for today·s research 
in cascaded inference. Included in this chapter is a review of a number 
of findings that are relevant to the proposed methodology. 
Chapter IV 
General systems theories range from the very formal to the informal 
types. The aim of this chapter is to point out the position and role 
of Bayesian inquiry as an instrument or tool in general systems. 
Chapter V 
A framework for Bayesian inquiry is introduced. Next, formal 
mathematical models are developed and an algorithm for using them is 
discussed. This algorithm is then applied to an actual problem. The 
results are presented along with an analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the method. 
Chapter VI 
3 
In the concluding chapter some of the problems encountered in the 
research and development of the thesis are listed with suggestions for 
further research. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of this study lies in the provision of a formal 
and methodologically sound framework for using experts. This study 
clarifies the heuristic art of inquiry and is a significant step 
toward disciplining Delphi. Once this disciplined exercise has been 
completed, it should open up the Delphi technique to analytical studies 
in such areas as comparative social and psychological controls. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUNB: BAYESIAN INFERENCE 
PROBABILITY CONCEPTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the interpretations of 
probability in Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches to inference. This 
discussion will provide the foundation for the remainder of the thesis. 
The most widely held theory of probability is the empirical, objec-
tive or frequency concept. This interpretation identifies probability 
as the observed behaviour of repetitive events. The objectivist inter-
pretation of probability is summarized by Fisherl 
... probability is the most elementary of statistical concepts. 
It is a parameter which specifies a simple d"ichotomy in an 
infinite hypothetical population, and it represents neither more 
nor less than the frequency ratio which we imagine such a popula-
tion to exhibit. 
In the necessary or logical concept, probability statements are 
not empirical statements. Instead, probability is a logical relation-
ship between a proposition and a body of evidence. For a given state-
ment S and a body of evidence E, there is one and only one degree of 
belief P, which S may have given the evidence E.2 Jeffreys summarized 
lR. A. Fisher, Statistical Methods for Research Workers, 13th ed. 
(New York: Hafner Publishing Company, Inc., 1959), p. 9. 
2Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Howard E. Smokler, eds., Studies in 
Subjective Probability (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), 
p. 5. 
this interpretation,3 
When we make an inference beyond the observational data, we 
express a logical relation between the data and the inference 
... It (the relation) assesses the support for the inference, 
given the data, ... This relation between a set of data and 
a conclusion is called probability. 
This interpretation of probability as a direct extension of logic has 
never been and is not active in shaping statistical oPinion. 4 
5 
The subjective concept is distinguished from the necessary concept 
by its denial that there is one and only one probability which represents 
a relation between a statement and a body of evidence. For a subjec-
tivist, probability values represent the degree of beliefs that an 
individual has in a given statement. This value is not uniquely deter-
mined and may differ from person to person. This concept is often 
labeled as the personalistic interpretation of probability. 
The subjective view of probability was originated by Jacob Bernoulli 
and systematically developed by Laplace. Outstanding works by de 
Finetti,5 Good6 and Savage have contributed much to the development 
and acceptance of this theory. The personalistic interpretation is 
3Harold Jeffreys, Scientific Inference, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 22. 
4L. J. Savage, liThe Foundations of Statistics Reconsidered," in 
Studi es in Sub' ecti ve Probabi1 it , eds. Henry E. I~yburg, Jr. and 
Howard E. Smokler New York: John ~~iley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 176. 
5Sruno de Finnetti, "Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective 
Sources," in Studies in Sub"ective Probabilit , eds. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 
and Howard E. Smok1er New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964}, p. 
93-158. 
7 
summarized by Savage. 
6 
Personalistic views hold that probability measures the confidence 
that a particular individual has in the truth of a particular pro-
position, for example, the proposition that it will rain tomorrow. 
These views postulate that the individual concerned is in some ways 
'reasonable' but they do not deny the possibility that two reason-
able individuals faced with the same evidence may have different 
degrees of confidence in the truth of the same proposition. 
A1thcugh individuals may have different degrees of belief for a pro-
position probability assignments to the set of alternatives must be 
coherent as well as consistent8, and furthermore this set or body of be-
liefs must be rational. 
Coherence of a body of beliefs may be explained in terms of bets. 
For a person obeying the postulate of coherence, it is impossible to 
set up a series of wagers which ensures that the bettor will lose re-
gardless of the outcome. Anyone engaging in such a gamble would be 
acting irrationally or incoherently. 
Although differences exist among the three schools of probability, 
there is an important commonality among them. 
Considering the confusion about the foundations of statistics, it 
is surprising and certainly gratifying, to find that almost every-
one is agreed on what the purely mathematical properties of 
probability are. Virtually all controversy therefore centers on 
questions of interpreting the generally accepted axiomatic concept 
of probability, that iS~ of determining the extramathematical pro-
perties of probability. 
7L. J. Savage, The Foundation of Statistics (New York: John 
Wiley Sons, Inc., 1954), p. 3. 
8A number of scoring rules have been developed toward fulfillment 
of the consistency requirements; see R. L. Winkler, ~Scoring Rules 
and the Evaluation of Probability Assessors,~ Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 64 (1969): p. 1073-1078. 
9Savage, The Foundation of Statistics, p. 2. 
7 
BAYESIAN AND NON-BAYESIAN APPROACHES TO INFERENCE 
A Bayesian statistician contends that probability values represent 
a degree of belief. And Bayes' rule provides the formal mechanism for 
revising probabilities in the light of new information. The probability 
P(H} of a certain proposition H is revised to P{HIO} when the event 0 
is observed, 
P(Hlo) = P{OlH}P(H) 
p(O) 
The terms P(OIH} and P(H) in the numerator are called the likelihood 
function and prior distribution. p(HIO) is the posterior distribution. 
There is no disagreement on the mathematics of Bayes' theorem. 
The debate is on the interpretation and usage of information in the 
theorem. For non-Bayesian analyses, the use of prior information is 
uncontroversial only if the prior information is substantiated by 
empirical evidence. With Bayesian theory, any and all available informa-
tion, both subjective and empirical, has relevance in statistical 
inference. All available information is incorporated formally in the 
analysis of the prior distribution. This is in marked contrast with 
non-Bayesian analyses where subjective information is generally used 
informally and often arbitrarily. Formal techniques for establishing 
prior distributions must be based on available sample evidence. 
Bayesian inference can be based on prior subjective and sample 
information. There is no need to justify inferences in terms of 
Decision 
Theory 
Non-Bayesian 
Frequency 
Concepts 
(Fisher) 
Statistics 
Inference 
Inference 
(Scientific Knowledge) 
Necessary 
Concepts 
(Jeffereys) 
Subject'; ve 
Concept'.: 
(Savage & Good) 
Figure 1. Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Inference 
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9 
behavior in repeated samples. This is not to say that the results fran! 
repeated samples are not of interest; on the contrary. the better the 
sample evidence, the better the Bayesian estimation. 
Another feature of Bayes· theorem deserves comment. It is a 
learning model and invaluable in accomplishing what Jeffreys and others 
consider a major objective of science, namely, learning from experience. 10 
Under the informationless state, i.e., diffuse or uniform prior 
distribution, Bayesian and classical procedures give identical results. 
If the prior distribution is not diffused, the results will be quite 
different. 
There are differences amongst Bayesians themselves, as Good notes. 
Several different kinds of Baye~ians exist, but it seems to me that 
the essential defining property of a Bayesian is that he regards 
it as meaningful to talk about the probability P(HIE) of a hypo-
thesis H, given evidence E. Consequently, he will make more use 
of Bayes· theorem than a non-Bayesian will. Bayes· theorem itself 
is a trival consequence of the product axiom of probability, and 
it is not a belief in this theorem that makes a person a Bayesian. 
Rather it is a readiness to incorporate intuitive probability 
into statistical theory and practice, and into the philosophy of 
science and of the behavior of human, animals, and automata, and 
in an understanding of all forms of communication, and everything. 
The mathematics used by a Bayesian can be interpreted without 
agreeing with his philosophy ... An extreme Bayesian believes that 
every intuitive probability is precise, whereas less extreme 
Bayesian regard intuitive probabilities as only partially ordered 
so that each probability merely lies in some interval of values. 
One is more or less a Bayesian depending on the precision with 
which one is prepared to make intuitive probability estimates. 11 
10Arnold Zellner, liThe Bayesian Approach and Alternatives in 
Econometrics, II in Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, ed. Michael D. 
Intriligator (London: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1969), p. 180. 
llGood, The Estimation 
Bayesian Methods, p. 8-10. 
on Modern 
SUBJECTIVE INFORMATION 
The motivation for using any and all information in a Bayesian 
approach is clear. However, the concept of information in Bayesian 
analysis needs clarification. Information is a loose term and may be 
viewed as the evidence which could lead to a reduction of uncertainty 
10 
in a decision situation or a change in belief. The former may be 
considered quantitative and the latter qualitative information (see 
Table 1).12 From a Bayesian viewpoint, the change in belief is a more 
general notion than a reduction of uncertainty. Reduction of uncer-
tainty is a special case of change in belief. Information concepts 
based on relative frequency is a well developed theory and is attributed 
to Shannon and Weaver. In contract, subjective information theory 
is relatively undeveloped. 
For the Bayesian approach to qualify as an instrument of inquiring 
systems, it may be necessary to consider as a prerequisite an unambig-
uous definition of subjective information. Following Jamison13 and 
Roby,14 this presents no difficulty. Let b be a person's belief 
about a set of m mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
possible states of nature, e = {e l , e2, ... , em}' Define an m - 1 
l20ean Jamison, "Bayesian Information Usage," in Information 
and Inference, eds. Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes (Holland: 
O. Reidel Publishing Company, 1970), p. 29. 
13Ibid ., p. 30-31. 
14R. Roby, "Be1ief States and the Uses of Evidence," Behavioral 
Science 10 (1965): p. 255-270. 
'-
TABLE I 
THEORIES OF INFORMATION 
Concept of Probability 
Concept of 
I nforma ti on 
Change in 
Belief 
- - -
Reduction of 
Uncertainty 
~ 
Relative Frequency Subjective 
CR CS 
- - -
f--
- -
RR RS 
CR: Change in belief as reflected in the change in 
relative frequency. 
RR: Reduction of uncertainty as reflected in the 
change in relative frequency. 
CS: Change in belief as reflected in the change in 
subjective probabilities. 
RS: Reduction of uncertainty as reflected in the 
change in subjective probabilities. 
11 
12 
dimensional simplex ~ in an m dimensional space in the following 
manner: E = {bl t bi = 1, o~bi~ 1, for 1 ~i4lmJ. An intuitive 
l 
interpretation of the vector b = Ib1, ... ,bm} is a probability distri-
bution over the state of nature with bi the probability of the ith 
state, P(ei), hence b = [p(ei), ... ,p(em)]. E is the set of all 
possible probability distributions over the m states of nature . 
• Let b be a person's initial belief before he receives some 
I information IF, and b his belief afterwards. The amount of relevant 
information IF received between • I band b may be expressed by, 
i nf (I F) = ,; - b" = t (b; - b;) 2 
i 
or better still, 
mJm - 1 
inf (IF) = ___ _ 
2 (m - 1) 
This measure of information, like Shannon's, is sensitive to m. 
Thus, subjective information can be discussed in a clear and formal 
way. Furthermur~, the Bayesian measure seems to be the only method 
available for quantifying the otherwise non-quantifiable aspects of 
information. 
CHAPTER III 
APPRAISAL OF EXISTING BAYESIAN INFERENCE MODELS 
INTRODUCTION 
Bayesian information processing is in its infancy, due partly to 
recent acceptance of the subjective or Bayesian view of probability. 
Edwards' (1962) Probabilistic Information Processing (PIP)15 was a major 
contribution. It was one of the first attempts to apply Bayes' theorem 
in a man-computer interacting mode. The use of the standard Bayes' 
model has a limitation: it requires that the data set be available. 
Reality is too rich to permit this simplification. 
Dodson (1961) presented a modified Bayes theorem (MBT) based on 
the notion of expectation. 16 Gettys and Wi11ke (1969)17 published a 
mathematical representation of Dodson's model which relaxed the cer-
tainty requirement of the Bayes' theorem. Gettys (1969) in an 
15W. Edwards, "Dynamic Decision Theory and Probabilistic Informa-
tion Processing," Human Factors 4 (1962), p. 59-73. 
16J. D. Dodson, "Simu1ation system design for a TEAS simulation 
research facility," (Los Angeles: Planning Research Corporation, 
November 1961, No. AFCRL-1112, PRC R-194). 
17Char1es F. Gettys and T. A. Wi11ke, liThe Application of 
Bayes's Theorem When the True Data State is Uncertain," Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance 4 (1969), p. 125-141. 
14 
unpublished work18 derived another model of Dodson's MBT for independent 
19 
multiple inputs. A review of these contributions is discussed in 
the following sections. 
PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS (PIP) 
Edwards (1962) introduced the notion of PIP because of his con-
cern about the optimal use of information in military and business 
situations. The motivation behind designing this system was to relieve 
human information processors from the routine calculations involved in 
Bayes' theorem. In this model, men are taught to estimate the prob-
ability that a data set D would be observed given a specific hypothesis~ 
i.e., P(DIH). The program then integrates these estimates~ p(DIH) 
across the data and across the hypotheses by means of Bayes' theorem. 
The resulting output is a set of a posteriori probabilities, P(H\D). 
The model permits the talents of both man and machine to complement 
each other and to be used to the best advantage. Bayes' theorem 
is an optimal way of aggregating information, whether from one source 
or from many sources. The usefulness of the model is limited because 
D is assumed to be known. This requirement is obviously too restric-
tive. Tversky and Kahneman (1974)20 report that man may be as poor at 
18Charles F. Gettys, itA case 'Ilhere Dodson's MBT is appropriate," 
(Mimeo copy, University of Oklahoma, 1969). 
19The interpretation of the unpublished works by Dodson and Gettys 
is based on the publication by Gettys and Willke, because the former 
remains inaccessible. 
20A.Tversky and D. Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases," Science 18b (1974): p. 1124-1131. 
estimating P(DIII) values as he is at estimating a posteriori prob-
abilities. This problem, however, may be alleviated with formal 
21 
training. 
MODIFIED BAYES' THEOREM 
15 
In Dodson's model, uncertainty concerning the data or primary 
event is incorporated into the posterior probability through the notion 
of expectation. The uncertainty in the data is denoted by w. 
Expectation (Ho() = t;(Ei)P(HdIEi ) (1) 
i 
In this model, the elements in the "knowledge" state E = fEl, ... ,EmJ 
are assumed to be mutually exclusive and one of these must occur. 
Each Ei is a "posterior" probability, i.e. ¥{Ei} = P(Eilw). The 
above equation (1) may be expanded, 
( I ) - P{H.,()P(Eil Hd ) P HE· - -~---'--':::"'-
,,1 LP(Hj)P(EilHj) 
j 
Since, P(Ei ) = LP(Hj}P(E;lHj} 
j 
(2) 
21A study by Robert L. Winkler (liThe Assessment of Prior Distri-
butions in Bayesian Ana1ysis," Journal of American Statistical Associa-
tion (September 1967), p. 777-795.) demonstrated that with preliminary 
training in probability assessment, the results showed marked 
improvement. 
T'~erefore , 
Expectation (3) 
Thus uncertainty is expressed in the form of }t(Ei ). 
A more explicit form of MBT was derived by Gettys and Willke 
(1969). Since w is assumed to have occurred, but may not have been 
observed, Ei is conditional on w. 
~(Ei) = P(Eilw) (4) 
Also 
Expectation (H~ ) = P(H~Jw) (5) 
16 
Assuming Markovian conditional independence, the explicit form of Dodson's 
MBT is, 
L P(Eilw)P(EiIH~ } P (H..II w) = P ( H " ) ~ .. P(Ei) 
i 
(6) 
The above model was generalized for multi-inputs, wl , ... ,wk, where 
each wk leads to a distinctive set of knowledge states fEi k 1. 
1 k - 1 k-l L p(E~lwk)p(E~I~ ) 
P(H Iw , ... ,W ) - P(H \W , ... ,w ) --"'-k---
If Ii P(E.} 
i=l 1 (7) 
17 
RELEVANT FINDINGS 
A number of experimental findings illustrating the justification 
in support of the proposed methodology are summarized below. One such 
set of findings by Gettys et al. 22 indicates that results can be improved 
by decomposing multi-state inferences into a series of single-stage 
inferences and then combining them with an appropriate algorithm. A 
second set is due to Youssef who concludes: 
Subjective cascaded (multi-step) inference was less conservative 
than non-cascaded (one-step) inference at all diagnostic levels. 
These results support the generality of the hypothesis that unless 
diagnosticity is very low, cascaded inf23ence is more nearly optimal than its non-cascaded controls. 
Conservatism in probablistic inferences (single-stage) was repeatedly 
found in many earlier studies; however, this is not a valid assumption 
for cascaded inference. 24 Finally, Winkler,25 in his experiments with 
questions regarding contemplation of future samples and hypothetical 
lotteries, concludes that it is often useful to consider the judgment 
22Charles Gettys et al., "Multiple State Probabilistic Information 
Processing," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 10 
(December 1973): p. 374-378. 
23Zakhour I. Youssef, liThe Effects of Cascaded Inference on the Sub-jective Va1ue of Information,1I Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance 10 (December 1973): p. 359-363. 
24David A. Schum, IIConc1uding Comments," Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance 10 (December 1973): p. 427. 
25Robert L. Winkler, liThe Quantification of Judgment: Some Experi-
mental Results,1I Journal of American Statistical Association, Proceedings 
(1967): p. 386-394. 
of a number of experts rather than one. Experimental findings in 
Bayesian information processing have also emphasized the advantage of 
using expertise. 26 In a later finding, Winkler concluded that it was 
18 
not unreasonable to ask an assessor to give probability estimates. Also, 
with training and experience, inconsistencies in their estimates were 
significantly reduced. 
Beach, in a study comparing man as probabilistic information processor 
with the normative Bayes' model, concluded that: 
... Ss [assessors] possess a rule for revising subjective proba-
bilities that they apply to whatever subjective probabilities they 
have at the moment. . . . As has been amply demonstrated, the Ss 
[assessor's] revision rule is essentially Bayes' theorem. That is 
to say, Ss' revision can be predic27d with a good deal of precision using Bayes' theorem as the model. 
Another useful finding is in the form of empirical results found 
in Delphi methodology;28, 29, 30 and in personality theory and social 
26C. Stael von Holstein, Assessment and Evaluation of Subjective 
Probability Distribution (Stockholm: The Economic Research Institute, 
1970), p. 22. 
2h. R. Beach, "Accuracy and Consistency in the Revision of Sub-jective Probabilities," IEEE Transactions on Human Factors in 
Electronics 7 (March 1966): p. 29-36. 
28An excellent collection of articles on Delphi methodology may 
be found in The Del hi Method: Techni ues and A lications, edited by 
Harold A. Linstone and M. Turoff New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Co., 1975). 
29Joseph P. Martino, liThe Lognormality of Delphi Estimates," 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 1 (1970): p. 355-358. 
30Norman C. Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study 
of Group Opinion (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, RM-5888-Pr, June 
1969) . 
psychology. 31 Studies in these areas demonstrated the lognormal 
characteristics of human responses. The theoretical justification 
in these findings comes from combining the well-known Weber-Fechner 
law32 and the theory that individual judgment can be stated as a 
simple additive combination of informational inputs. 33 • 34 
19 
31 D. Cartwright, "Risk Taking by Individual and Groups: An 
Assessment of Research Employing Choice Dilerrmas," Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 20 (1971): p. 361-378. 
32M. F. M. Osborne, "Brownian Motion in the Stock Market," in 
The Random Character of Stock Market Prices, ed. P. H. Cootner (Cam-
bridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1964), p. 100-128. 
33N. H. Anderson, "A Simple Model for Information Integration," 
in Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, eds. R. P. Abelson 
et al. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), p. 731-743. 
34Devendra Sahal, liOn the Lognormality of Bayesian Information,.' 
Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, 1974. 
CHAPTER IV 
RELEVANCE TO GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
General systems theory may be viewed as a~ attempt to stimulate, 
organize, understand and control II sys tems" and their components. The 
term systems is generally defined as a composition of elements which are 
related and form a whole. 
An important trend in general systems theory is the development of 
methods which permit the construction of conceptual systems where inter-
actions between elements are sufficiently, but not completely, incor-
porated. 35 According to Klir, there is need to incorporate probabilistic 
concepts in systems methodologies. The existing theories of Klir, 
Mesarovic and Wymore are generally inadequate because of this lack of 
probabilistic consideration, which is a sufficient justification for 
the present study. Wymore has recognized the incompleteness in his 
theory and the need for development in the direction of probability 
theory. To quote Wymore himself: 
35George J. Klir, ed., Trends in General Systems Theory (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 6. 
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It is quite clear that in the definition or imposition of measures 
of effectiveness on various sets of systems, probability measures 
will play an important part, but these will be extremely arbitrary, 
based not only on empirical data but also 0~6subjective appraisals 
as well as on the desirability of outcomes. 
Klir's approach to general systems is based on the identification or 
classification of problems according to their fundamental systemic 
traits. 37 His approach, however, presupposes the availability of 
empirical information so that probability considerations are based on a 
traditional frequency interpretation. Although Sutherland's (1973)38 
approach is neither theoretical nor methodological like those of 
Klir, t1esarovic, and Wymore, his approach explicitly shows the importance 
and role of Bayesian analysis as a heuristic instrument in general 
systems. 
RELEVANCE TO GENERAL SYSTEMS 
The role of Bayesian analysis in general systems is perhaps best 
illustrated by Sutherland's concepts of analytical ideal-types. In 
this approach, it is presumed that all systems problems possess inherent 
36Wayne Wymore, IIA Wattled Theory of Systems,1I in Trends in General 
Systems Theory, ed., George Klir (Hew York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1972), p. 29l. 
37George J. Klir, An Approach to General Systems Theory (~ew York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969). 
38John W. Sutherland, A General Systems Philosophy for Social 
and Behavioral Sciences (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1973). 
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properties which can be classified as either deterministic, moderately 
stochastic, severely stochastic or indeterminate. 39 
Associated with each of the analytical-types are instrumental 
categories which are expected to be the most effective and efficient 
in dealing with problems that are classified by the four ideal-types 
(see Table II). By using instruments that are constantly congruent 
to the properties of the system, that is, using those instruments for 
which the problem fits at that stage of the analysis, it becomes 
possible to minimize potential errors. 
Normatively, the analytic process proceeds from indeterminacy to 
determinacy. In practice, a system or problem is expected to respond 
to analytical efforts. Just how far the analysis ~an go from indeter-
minacy to determinacy depends on the inherent properties of the 
problem. However, by adhering to systems congruence, the analytic 
process will approach optimal efficiency (see Table II). 
A Bayesian approach is in no way opposed to any of the existing 
general systems theories; rather, it complements them. This is 
illustrated in Table III. 
39Ibid . 
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TABLE II I 
BAYESIAN INQUIRY IN SYSTEMS THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE 
SYSTEM OR PROBLEM 
TYPE 
(1) Deterministic 
... data bases and 
causal re1ation-
ships are highly 
specific and ac-
curate with res-
pect to the pheno-
menan at hand. 
(2) Moderately 
Stochastic 
... basic causal 
relationships are 
ANALYTICAL PRECEDENTS 
AND PROCEDURES 
ASSOCIATED ANALYTICAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
There is expected to be -Finite -State System 
Analysis Models 
one and only one 'proba-
b1e ' event ... genera11y 
a simple replicate of 
present and/or past e-
vents (or parametric 
value). Hence we 
search for one-answer 
projection or transform 
functions which 'fit ' 
the temporal and/or 
cross-sectional data 
base available to us. 
Here we are concerned 
with the possibility of 
-Linear Programming 
and Max-Min Models 
-Optimization Models 
-Regression, correla-
tion, time series and 
spectral analysis 
techniques, with error 
treated exogenously 
(if at all). 
-Range estimation 
techniques (e.g., 
probabilistic pro-jection models). 
probably a-priori 
known (and accu-
rate), but data 
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a single state variable -Numerical approxima-
tion techniques (e.g., 
or parameter assuming some Taylor Series). 
value within a pre-spe- -Finite State systems 
analysis techniques. 
base is incomplete ... cified, manageable range. 
hence the parame-
tric uncertainty. 
(3) Severely 
Stochastic 
., .data bases might 
be fairly good but 
causal models are 
ill-defined or 
entity is inherently 
Here we might consider a 
range of significantly 
different events which 
might occur, each of 
which will lead to 
capable of assuming highly differentiated 
anyone of some set 'futures.' Empirical 
of pre-definable investigation will be 
states. used to 'converge' on 
one or another of the 
futures. 
-Shock Models (e.g., 
those semi-deter-
ministic econometric 
constructs which treat 
error nonspecifically). 
-Game-based Models 
-Stochastic systems 
analysis techniques. 
-Adaptive or dynamic 
(usually Bayesian 
based) programming 
algorithms. 
(4) Indeterminate 
... there is no rele-
vant data base and 
the inherent causal 
relationships for 
the phenomenon at 
hand are a-priori 
unallegorizable. 
Typical examples are 
Here, lacking pre-spec-
cified alternative out-
comes, futures must be 
deduced by references to 
any generalized, empiri-
cally-unvalidated theo-
retical constructs which 
might exist. 
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With so many structural 
and relational (dynamic) 
unknowns, the analyst 
can only use the most 
gross analytical instru-
ments: 
-deductive analysis 
leading to the gener-
ation of broadly-
defined possible 
future 'states' 
(qualitative or 
categorical alterna-
tives). 
found in the areas of -stochastic simulation 
meth~ds. 
futureology, i.e., The usual strategy is to 
technological fore- gradually narrow the 
casting and techno- range of alternatives 
logical assessments. so that the indeterminate 
a-priori state may gra-
dually be transformed 
into a more actionable 
stochastic situation. 
-Bayesian analysis 
as a learning or 
heuristic instrument. 
CHAPTER V 
A BAYESIAN APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, we reviewed and presented the needs 
for a Bayesian approach to inquiring systems. In this chapter, we 
develop a Bayesian model and an algorithm for structuring inquiry. 
The algorithm is demonstrated with an example. This is followed with 
a discussion of the results along with an analysis of the advantages 
and disadvantages in the proposed method. 
Current methodologies for the utilization of experts--ranging 
from a brainstorming session to more sophisticated approaches--all 
tend to mask the expert's use of data from the user or decision-
maker. This masking robs the decision-maker the basic instrumentality 
he seeks--the manner by which the expert arrives at his opinion. The 
approach presented here is designed to take advantage of the expert's 
knowledge and reveal to the decision-maker the way in which the expert 
approaches his options and reasons he has for selecting particular 
alternatives. 
The proposed model is built on cascading principles,40 that 
is, the difficulty in assessing the connections--the causal relation-
ships--between an immeasurable primary event and a target set41 is 
made easier by decomposing the problem and using intermediate states. 
Unlike previous works on cascaded inferences,42, 43 the approach here 
focuses on incoherency.44 Specifically, the approach utilizes 
40The sequential nature of cascading can be described by an 
inference tree. 
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The tree is structured such that one (node) knowledge state is below 
another only if the inference from the node is required to make an in-
ference about the higher node. Thus, the inference at any stage is 
based on the inference about the knowledge states subordinate to it. 
By assuming the occurrence of the primary event w, we can begin the 
inference process using the information on C(, that is, P{ e;ii Iw). Each 
P{ o(i Iw) is used as inputs to the next stage, P{Hj ) c:(i)' 
41A primary event w is termed immeasurable if we cannot accurately 
derive P(w) by conventional methods. The term IItarget set ll is used 
here to mean a set of hypotheses or alternatives about which informa-
tion and judgments are sought from experts. 
42Dodson, IISimulation systems design for a TEAS simulation re-
search facil i ty. II 
43Gettys and Willke, liThe Application of Bayes's Theorem when 
Data State is Undertain,1I p. 125-141. 
44The tenn lIincoherency" relates to the mathematical errors 
made in expressing the estimates. The term IIconsistencyli relates to 
estimates made by an expert that correspond to his inner beliefs. 
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tldtJit"iOlltlI inforllldt.ion concerllill~J the elements in either' the kllnwled~w 
state set or the target set to improve the coherency of the estimates. 
The reassessment may be done directly or indirectly using a type II 
distribution. A type II probability distribution represents the un-
certainty about the initial estimates. 
Like the more sophisticated techniques, such as Delphi, the 
approach here also seeks to get judgments and opinions from several 
experts. However, in addition to this capability, the method structures 
the inference paths for the expert and formalizes the inquiry process. 
This provides more information in a form that allows easy identification 
of the salient factors of agreement and disagreement among the experts. 
It thus can identify the "gray area," i.e., the uncertainty aspect of 
the problem. Such capabilities provide the decision-maker with a 
better chance of making the IIbestll decision. 
AN APPROACH 
The proposed approach is as follows. Let H = [Hl , H2,.··,HmJ 
be a set of target hypotheses. Following Savage,45 Dodson46 and others, 
we consider the expectation of H as a conditional probability of a 
given primary event w, representing any and all information. 
45Savage, The Foundation of Statistics. 
46Dodson, "Simulation systems design for a TEAS simulation re-
search facility." 
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E(Hj ) = P(Hjlw), for each j. (8) 
Since w is immeasurable, inference may be made easier using ~, where 
01.= f«l' tX2,···,otn) is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive, 
subjective knowledge states due to w (fig. 2). 
By assuming Markovian properties, the above system (fig. 2) may 
be represented, 
P (H j I w) = L P (H j I e<'i ) P ( p( i 1 w), for eac h j. (9) 
j 
Obviously, included in w, inter alia, is the feeling or belief about 
the elements within the set under consideration. 47 The above equation 
may be viewed as follows: (1) the term P(H. I~.) may be viewed as a 
J 1 
prior decision rule and (2) once the judgments on the P(o(iJw) are found, 
hence given by the assessor, then P(Hjlw) becomes the current, a 
posteriori, decision rule. 
Suppose additional information from a primary event r concerning 
the elements in ol becomes available, then a reassessment of t1l may 
be considered (fig.3). 
47Meadows, Forrester and others refer to this as subjective 
causality or assumed causality. 
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This system with r~arkovian properties may be represented by. 
=L P (H. I ttl' ,w) P ( 0( ., r , w ) J 1 
i 
Since 
_ P{Hj ,w)p( o/i IHj ,w) P (H. 10(., w) - -"-----..::...-.--
J 1 4 P(HjfW)P(o(ilHj'w) 
J 
We have 
L P ( H . ,w) P ( d· I H . ,w) I . P(HjJr,w) = J 1 J P( tJ(i r,w), for each J. E p(Hjrw)p(~.IH.,w) 
i J 1 J (10) 
The change in the probability of any item in the set is simply, 
t1P(~i) = P(t'{;lr,w) - P(o(ilw), for each i. (11) 
L1P(Hj ) = [p(olilr,w)p(Hjl~i'W) - P(()(;lw)P(Hj )01;), for 
i 
each j. (12 ) 
This formulation (equation 10) may be easily contrasted with Turoff's 
33 
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cross impact mode1 48 for deriving coherent estimates. However, the above 
formulation takes into account the combined effects of all the ~i's on H. 
Suppose new information from a primary event s becomes available 
and concerns only H, then the coherency of the estimates on H may be 
assessed directly. Let ~= ff1' f2' 
ledge states due to s (fig. 4). 
., ell be the subjective know-
48Turoff assumed the probability of an event to be a function of 
the remaining n-1 probabilities, P. = P'(Pl'p~" ... ,p ), where p. is 
the probability of event i. The c~ange~ in tne estimat~s due to 1 
additional new information are expressed by the difference equation 
dP: = [ ~%f! + ~~/ 
I iN< " liJ~ 
where ~ is the collective impact not included in the defined set. Solving 
the difference equation yields, ) 
1) _ I I( I of e~p (- r.. - ~ Cilc ~) I 
f; - / ' i:t" 
where c. represents the cross impact factors, and ~. represents the "residua~1I term containing the effect of higher order i~teractions among 
the Pk probabilities. 
By expressing each event (hypotheses) in terms of intermediate 
states, as in the proposed formulations, the changes in the estimates 
due to additional information are derived using the effect of new 
information on the ~. rather than on the H.'s directly. A complete 
discussion on the imp1ication for cross impact analysis is found in 
Sahal and Vee, "Cross Impact Analysis; An Alternative Formulation," 
Portland State University, Portland, Oregon 1975. 
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Figure 4. Inference on H. 
The above system may be expressed by, 
P(Hj\S,W) = L P(H j I Pk'W)P( ~k/s,w) 
k 
36 
_ \ P(Hjlw)p( ~kJHj'W) P( ~kls,w), for each j. 
L ~ P(Hj\w)P( ~kIHj'W) (13) 
k 
The change in the decision rule is simply, 
4 P(Hj ) = { P(Hjl Pk'W)P( ~ds,w) - { P(Hj /oIi )P(olil w) 
(14 ) 
By taking into account any new knowledge, the coherency of the esti-
mates on H is addressed in the above formulation. 
In this section, a model was proposed for deriving a quantitative 
relationship between a target set and an immeasurable primary event. 
Intermediaries, hence knowledge states, were used to assist the 
inference process. Crucial to the approach is the use of new subjective 
knowledge to derive coherent estimates. 
ELICITING ESTIMATES 
An expert may be employed to furnish the necessary inputs to 
the model. The decision to consult an expert, or more than one expert, 
would depend on the problem and the decision-maker's confidence in the 
judgments of experts. Although there is strong evidence to support 
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the assumption that knowledgeable individuals can make useful estimates 
based on incomplete information, a well developed theory for selecting 
and sorting out better experts from poorer ones is not available. Here, 
we limit the discussion to the topics of accuracy and honesty.49 A 
complete review would lead far from the focus of this thesis. 
The accuracy of an expert may be tested by a calibration 
process~O, 51 The expert is gauged by a series of performances. He 
is asked to give midrange estimates for a large number of variables. 
If the true values fall in the midrange of half of the assessments and 
an equal number in the upper and lower quartiles, the expert is said 
to be externally validated. Testing an expert on issues similar or 
related to the actual problem can provide the decision-maker with a 
means to assess the accuracy of the expert. The testing procedure is 
illustrated in the empirical example below. 
Scoring rules involve the computation of a score based on the 
expert's stated estimates and on the event that actually occurs. 
Used in this manner, they provide another formal means of evaluating 
expert's past performances, and so serve as a screening mechanism for 
the selection of experts. Furthermore, scoring rules are useful in 
49A complete review is found in [~orman C. Dalkey, "Toward a Theory 
of Group Estimation," in The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, 
eds. Harold A. Linstone and M. Turoff (New York: Addison-Wesley Pub-
1 ishing Co., 1975), p. 236-26l. 
50peter A. Morris, "Bayesian Expert Resolution" (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Stanford University, 1971). 
51Howard Raiffa, "Assessments of Probabilities," Harvard University, 
1969. 
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the sense that they provide motivation for honesty of response by en-
couraging experts to consider the situation at hand carefully before 
reporting their judgments. 52 For example, each expert is induced to think 
that his personal future, i.e., wealth, reputation, etc., is affected 
by his performance and it is to his advantage to report his judgments 
in an honest fashion. These testing procedures should help in sorting 
out the better experts. 53 
If the decision is to employ a group of experts, then their in-
dividual distributions may be combined into a single distribution. 
However, care should be taken to avoid possible incoherencies due to 
the aggregating method. As Dalkey has indicated,54 
... when group probability estimates are manipulated, care 
should be taken to assure that the manipulations are compatible 
with the original aggregation. For example, if group estimates 
are multiplied, then some multiplicative aggregation such as 
the geometriC mean would be appropriate. If group estimates are 
to be added, weighted means might be appropriated. 
Thus the difficulties encountered in aggregating might outweigh the 
advantages of group process. In these situations, one expert should 
be picked. The selection may be made on the basis of tests of accuracy, 
honesty and past performances in related exercises, where conditions are 
comparable. Another criteria in the selection process is the judgments 
of peers. 
52Robert L. ~jinkler, "Rewarding Expertise in Probability Assessment," 
Indiana University, 1975, 
53If the experts are also stakeholders, hence decision-makers, 
selecting and sorting may be complicated by additional factors such as 
politics, position within the group and investments. 
54Norman C. Dalkey, "An Impossibility Theorem for Group Probability 
Function" (The Rand Corporation, P-4862, June 1972); p. 5. 
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PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
In this section, we introduce a procedure for using the above 
model. The discussion presented here is brief. Details are post-
poned until the next section where the algorithm is illustrated by an 
example. Prior to introducing the problem to the assessors, the 
decision-maker must select elements for the knowledge states and target 
sets. He has to balance the desire for greater accuracy, hence more 
elements and finer partition of the set, against the lower cost and 
simpler calculations obtained in using fewer elements and a coarse 
partiti on. 
Initial estimates for P{Hj Idi ) and p{ ot;\w) are obtained from 
each assessor. Their estimates for each P{Hjlw) are then calculated. 
Next, depending on the availability of additional information and desire 
to check for incoherency, the assessors may be asked to reassess either 
0(, H, or both. The reassessment may be accomplished directly or 
indirectly using type II distribution. 55 The additional information 
may be collected from self evaluation or feedback. It is up to the 
decision-maker to choose the alternative that is both feasible and 
suitable for his particular problem. In either case, the final results 
are then calculated using these revised estimates. 
55Additional details on the use of type II probability to 
Bayesian inquiry are found in Sahal and Vee, "Delphi: An Investiga-
tion from a Bayesian Viewpoint," Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change 7 (1975), p. 165-178. 
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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
In adopting the conceptual model to a "real world" problem, we 
relaxed the mutually exclusive and exhaustive assumptions on the 
knowledge states. This was necessary because the experts used had 
diverse backgrounds and came from different academic disciplines. 
Consequently, they examine the problem from different perspectives. 
At the moment there is no formal unified methodology for structuring 
interdisciplinary inquiry. Therefore, it was not possible to struc-
ture a formal set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive knowledge 
states with which all the members of the panel could agree. 56 The 
approach presented is capable of eliciting information from experts 
in diverse fields. Due to a time constraint, type II distribution was 
not used. The experts were asked to reassess their estimates 
directly. 
A second example, in this instance a hypothetical problem with 
formal characteristics illustrating the use of type II distribution, 
is found in appendix C. 
56Although it is technically possible to derive a set of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive knowledge states for a given panel, the cost 
and time constraints in "real world" situations would tend to dis-
courage such an endeavor. And should the makeup of the panel change, 
a new set of knowledge states would have to be rederived. 
If the elements in the alpha set are time dependent, they may 
well be mutually exclusive. 
PROBLEM 
Oregon, unlike most states, is faced with the problem of people 
moving into the state, particularly into the Willamette Basin Area. 
This is a problem that is continuously being discussed by members of 
the state legislature and citizen groups. Assume that we are faced 
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with the task of investigating a set of alternative actions to ensure 
a IIlivable Oregon ll in the future (25 years from now), that is, a 
situation where population is balanced with environmental factors. 
Since the available information, i.e., settlement patterns, migration 
trends, etc., is scattered and incomplete, and because of the com-
plexity of the problem, direct analysis was ruled out. However, an 
indirect method, in this case a cascaded process, may be used to 
conduct the investigation. 
OBJECTIVE 
Due to continued in-migration and the resulting demographic 
changes in Oregon, i.e., w, we want to obtain judgments on the follow-
ing set of alternatives. 57 
Lesiglation to attract industry, capital and revenue to 
the state. 
Legislation to discourage in-migration, i.e., residence 
requirements for public education and state-sponsored 
social services. 
H3 Research to find ways and means to preserve or improve the 
quality of life with the expected growth. 
H4 No action until the in-migration problem is understood fully. 
57This problem was developed with the help of Paul Molnar, who 
is a social anthropologist at Portland State University. 
42 
Since it is not possible to derive p(Hjlw) directly. the knowledge 
space was partitioned into ten states to facilitate the inference of H. 
~ Continued suburban sprawl, similar to what we have today. 
0(2 Urbanization, with people moving back into the cities due 
to various factors such as energy shortages and the con-
venience of downtown. 
0(3 New population centers developing near local energy sources. 
a'4 Changes in attitudes, such as the continued acceptances of 
birth control and emphasis on zero population growth, re-
ducing the projected growth by as much as 15%. 
~5 Minimal net in-migration because of taxes and environmental 
control measures such as limiting density and land usages. 
0(6 Technological breakthrough so that energy will be a factor 
contributing to growth. . 
~ In-migration problem being short term, because most of the 
people moving into Oregon are either retired or will be 
retiring shortly, and so will die in about 10 years. 
&(8 An increase in pressure for more social services for both 
the young and old. 
0(9 Population growth stabilizing due to limited resources, 
jobs, etc. 
0(10 Oregon1s becoming a mecca for new development similar to 
California in the 1950 to 1960 1s. 
The estimates for P{ oIilw) may be derived by any suitable methods. A 
statistical ranking technique58 was used here because the procedure 
is free of prior commitment to a particular distribution. Secondly, 
58Lee H. Smith, "Ranking Procedures and Subjective Probability 
Distribution," Management Science 14 (December 1976): P. 236-249. 
Further details are found in M. G. Kendall, "Rank and Measures," 
Biometrika 49 (1963): p. 133-137. 
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it is much easier to rank relative probabilities than to assign abso-
lute probabilities per se. Third, little or no knowledge of probability 
theory is required. The procedure is as follows: 
a. Each assessor is asked to rank the alphas (0(. IS) in ascending 
order (from 1 to 10), that is, he is asked to'make a fore-
cast on the alphas for the prescribed time period and to 
arrange them from the least probable to the most probable. 
b. Using the arranged alphas, the assessor is asked to consider 
them in successive pairs and rank their differences. He is 
asked to compare his judgments on the difference between 
successive pairs and rank them. 
c. Finally, he is asked to give two probability va1ues--the 
least and most probable of the alphas. 
Further details on the procedure are discussed in appendix B. 
Using the quantified rankings and the probability values, a dis-
tribution is constructed for the alpha set. This may be done by computer 
(see appendix B). A similar procedure may be used to obtain conditional 
estimates for each P(Hj I&(i)' Since there are only four alternatives, 
the assessors were asked to give them directly. The values for 
p(H.lw) can now be calculated. 
J 
P(Hd w) 
P(H21w) 
P( H31w) 
= 
P(H1 \0(1) 
P(H2 \~1) 
(15 ) 
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A reassessment of 0( may be desi red to improve the coherency of 
the estimates, 
L ~(Hj /w)P(o(i IHj,w) p(H·lw)P(d·IH.,w) J 1 J P(~ Ir,w), for each j (16) j 
i 
where r is new knowledge concerning the potential interactions among 
the o(i IS. This may be done with the following procedure. 
1. From the previous round, we have a 4xl matrix 
P 4x 1 = (p (H j I w) ) 
2. Steps a to c may be used to get estimates for 
3. let 
BlOxl = A'lOxl4Xl = (b1,j ) 
( 17) 
(18) 
(19) 
Expand the B matrix to a diagonal matrix C, with diagonal 
elements, 
c .. = 
1 ,J 
1 
b1 . ,J 
, for all i=j 
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4. Expand P to a diagonal matrix, 
P(H1\w) 0 0 0 
0 P(H2\w) 0 0 (20) D4x4 = 0 0 P(H3\w) 0 
0 0 0 P(H 4(w) 
5. Then 
D4x4A4xlOClOxlO = F4x10 = (P(H j 1.(; ,1'1) ) (~l) 
6. The estimates for P(e/i I r,w) are derived using steps a to c. 
(22) 
7. The results for p(Hjlr,w) are calculated, 
(23) 
SELECTING EXPERTS 
The ideal expert is a knowledgeable demographer who is also active 
in either state government or in a citizen group concerned with the 
future of Oregon. But due to a limitation of resources and limited 
access to a number of qualified experts, the criteria used in selecting 
the panel were based on knowledge about the in-migration problem and 
interest in participating in the exercise. There were eight members 
on the panel. 
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1. R. D. is a professor in Systems Science, whose interest 
includes modeling and simulation and resource conservation. 
2. G. B. is a graduate student in Systems Science with research 
interest in policy science. 
3. R. L. is a graduate student in geography. 
4. P. M. is a former professor of anthropology, who is presently 
engaged in general systems research. 
5. T. P. is a team leader in the language arts department at a 
Beaverton school. 
6. D. S. is the controller at Portland Student Services, a non-
profit corporation providing housing for students attending 
Portland State University. 
7. E. W. is a professional social worker. 
8. W. W. is a graduate student in Systems Science. His disserta-
tion topic is the reliability of the power system at a major 
utility company in Oregon. 
Since one of the purposes of the exercise was to compare the 
results with the outcomes from conventional Delphi, the assessors were 
required to answer two sets of questionnaires in each round. Most of 
the panel members had never participated in a forecasting study. 
Because of the inexperience, both the model and the Delphi procedures 
were explained before the start of the exercise and each round was 
individually administered. After the completion of the exercise, members 
of the group were tested for their accuracy and knowledge of Oregon. 
The external test was a set of questions on Oregon, i.e., economic 
activities, natural resources, geography and population. Their 
answers were checked for accuracy and a score was assigned to each 
assessor (table V). 
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rl\BU IV 
DELPHI RESULTS 
Round 1 Round 2 
HI H2 H3 H4 HI H2 H3 H4 
Assessors 
G. B. .5 .3 .2 .0 .5 .3 .2 .0 
R. L. .5 .1 .3 .1 .5 .1 .3 .1 
P. M. .4 .5 .01 .09 .4 .5 .01 .09 
T. P. .6 .05 .25 .1 .55 .05 .3 .1 
D. S. .4 .3 .2 .1 .4 .25 .25 .1 
t" ~.J • .1 .6 .0 .3 .3 .5 .0 .2 ..... 
W. W. .1 .05 .4 .45 .2 .1 .4 .3 
TABLE V 
MODEL RESULTS 
HI H2 H H4 HI H2 H3 H4 Assessors 3 score 
G. B. 5 .412 .243 .272 .074 .411 .238 .278 .072 
R. L. 7 .380 .271 .235 .149 .326 .250 .268 .156 
P. M. 7 .327 .368 .066 .240 .303 .387 .066 .243 
T. P. 5 .059 .104 .582 .161 .064 .126 .613 .198 
D. S. 10 .348 .263 .275 .115 .337 .264 .282 .117 
E. W. 6 .662 .252 .056 .030 .695 .210 .060 .035 
W. W. 5 .403 .096 .273 .229 .380 .090 .278 .252 
The direct estimates from Delphi and the calculated estimates 
from the model are shown in tables IV and V.59 
AGGREGATION METHOD 
The aggregation method used will depend on many factors. Most 
important is the reasonableness of the independence assumption. If 
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we can demonstrate that experts based their estimates on independent 
information, then a multiplicative aggregation method may be appropriate. 60 
This seems to be a rather large assumption. A more realistic assump-
tion is that the estimates were based, at least in part, on the same 
information, i.e., similar training, experiences, etc. 61 
In this example, because of the criteria used in selecting the 
panel, the second assumption seems to be reasonable. A weighted 
means method known as 1I0pinion Pool lI or IIWeighted-Average ll was used. 62 
The median values from Delphi and the aggregated results are shown 
along with estimates from the "best!: expert in table VI. The weights 
were determined from the scores achieved in the accuracy test. 63 
59The panel started with eight members, but one resigned be-
cause of prior commitments. A list of the computer outputs are shown 
in appendix B. 
60If we assume independence, and that human responses are skewed 
and fit a lognormal distribution as indicated by Blackman and others, 
then one aggregating method is simply to multiply the individual dis-
tributions together. This assumption was used in the hypothetical 
example in appendix C. 
61 Robert L. Wi nkl er, liThe Consensus of Subjective Probabil ity 
Distribution," Management Science 15 (October 1968): p. 61-75. 
62,"1. Stone, liThe Opinion Pool ," Annals of Mathematical Statistics 
32 (1961): p. 1139-1342. 
63In the example, the weights were determined from the number of 
correct answers in the accuracy test. 
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TABLE VI 
FINAL RESULTS 
HI H2 H3 H4 
Delphi-median 
round 1 .4 .3 .2 .1 
round 2 .4 .25 .25 .1 
Model-median 
round 1 .380 .252 .272 .149 
round 2 .227 .238 .278 .156 
AGGREGRATION 
equa 1 wei ghts 
round 1 .370 .228 .251 .142 
round 2 .360 .224 .264 .153 
sea 1 ed wei ghts 
round 1 .372 .241 .240 .141 
round 2 .360 .236 .253 .151 
BEST EXPERT 
round 1 .348 .263 .275 .115 
round 2 .337 .264 .282 .117 
ANALYSIS 
The exercise has compared and contrasted a conventional Delphi 
and a structured inquiry process. There are several interesting and 
important findings. First, let us consider the results in table VI. 
Both methods led to the same choice for the most and least probable 
alternatives, Hl and H4. The advantage in cascading is that we can 
now examine judgments on the knowledge states and causal effects 
which led to the predicted values. From the data in appendix B , we 
can see that the knowledge states ofl' 0(8' orlO are considered to 
be the most likely. These are also dominant in the conditional 
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responses; in fact the IIpool" judgment is 11 "votes ll for Hl' 5 l votes" 
each for H2 and H3, and none for H4. Thus, cascading enables the 
decision-maker to gain additional information that otherwise would be 
lost or not available in a conventional Delphi. This is important 
because: (1) it identifies the specific items or information (alphas) 
which experts see as the leading causal factors, and (2) it enables 
the decision-maker, by using the dominant alphas, to relate the 
specific problem under consideration to other situations and decisions. 
Thus, ;n our example, the dominant alPhas--i'l' tXs' ~lO -- permit 
the decision-maker to consider these factors ;n relation to other 
policy areas such as land use planning, pollution control, etc. The 
alphas identified by the expert pool to be most important in demography 
can thus be related to the alpha selection in other problem areas 
as well. 
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There are some differences in the results using both methods. 
Tubles IV and V showed a shift in the results froll) assessors T. P. and 
E. W. This may be explained by examining the conditional responses. 
Using the defined set of knowledge states, T. P. judged H3 to be the 
most probable, and E. W. judged Hl to be the most likely. These shifts 
indicate that T. P. and E. W. may have considered different causal 
factors other than those in the defined knowledge states. An additional 
round could be designed to get the assessors to reveal them. 
The different patterns in assigning the alphas between ranks 3 
to 8 indicate a higher degree of uncertainty or a lack of sufficient 
knowledge to make judgments among the experts. This is reflected in 
the results for H2 and H3, and constitutes a "gray area" in the solution 
space. This ability of the model to specify the areas of uncertainty 
is important because it indicates which alphas are open to question 
or are unclear. Since there is a fuzziness about these alphas, even 
for experts, it indicates a need to obtain more information or to 
restate the alphas. In either case, the tool leads to the delimitation 
of the area of uncertainty and the decision-maker now has the option 
of initiating further efforts, such as restating the alphas for an 
additional round or revising the alphas and conducting another study, 
before commitment to a decision. 
Finally and most important, the dominant alphas can be used as 
potential signals or indicators. By monitoring the social (<<1,0(8)' 
technological (~O) and economic (0(1' rX8 ' dlO ) sectors for these 
signals, the decision-maker will be able to forecast with greater 
accuracy which of the alternatives will be enacted. 
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The benefit of more infonnation is not without certain dis-
advantages. The proposed approach took longer to complete than Delphi. 
It took an average of about 25 minutes longer for each round. The 
added time taxed the patience of some members of the panel. For some 
situations, such added cost may not be worth the added benefit of 
more information. 
There is also the possibility of presenting an alpha set that some 
members may consider to be either incomplete or inadequate for the 
particular situation. However, a possible solution to this problem is 
to have experts participate in the selection of the knowledge states. 
In this section, we demonstrated the feasibility of the model. 
While this exercise did not illustrate the case where additional new 
information was given to the experts, the approach is capable of 
handling this situation through an additional round. On the basis of 
the exercise, we cannot claim that the model improves the accuracy of 
the forecast. We can, however, see the advantages of the model. The 
proposed approach provides more information as well as greater insight 
into the basis for the forecast. The method also shows how the expert 
operates, revealing to the decision-maker the processes of decision as 
the alphas shift in the various rounds. This permits some insight into 
the manner in which experts consider the problem. 
Additional insights may be drawn by analyzing the expert's pro-
fessional discipline and background. Their selected alpha patterns 
may be representative of the opinions of a particular group of a sector 
of the population affected by the decisional alternatives. A decision-
maker having this information is better equipped to handle his 
problem. For example, a corporate manager knowing the attitudes of 
those concerned with a particular policy will select subordinates who 
will support his decision. A politician having this added information 
can prepare more effectively to win the support of a particular group 
or groups to implement a selected alternative. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSION 
SUMMARY 
An approach to Bayesian inquiry was presented. The proposed 
methodology is based on the concepts of cascaded inference. A feedback 
step was used to allow individuals to revise their initial estimates. 
The reassessment may be done either directly or indirectly. The 
indirect procedure uses a second order probability distribution to 
measure the imprecision or fuzziness in the initial estimates. 
The proposed method is an improvement over existing methods 
based on the use of Gayes' theorem as an inference model. A key feature 
of the proposed method is its applicability to problems where the 
primary events are either unobservable or unknown, hence immeasurable. 
The need for Bayesian techniques in general systems is obvious. The 
proposed methodology is a step tpward fulfi~ling that need. 
An algorithm utilizing the formal models was presented and 
demonstrated with examples. A computer program was written and used 
in working the exercises. An obvious extension is to program it for 
an interactive computer. This would allow the assessors to interact 
directly with the decision-maker through a console. Assessed dis-
tributions could also be programmed for display on the terminal to 
speed up the process. 
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FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are certain limitations in the model. The problem of in-
consistency requires further research. It is diffuclt to discriminate 
between "improbable" events with very small probability values in the 
order of 10-2 or higher. One possible approach is to construct a model 
of the problem where these events are related to another set of events 
which are easier to assess. 
The use of Fuzzy Sets as an instrument for expressing impression 
in estimating uncertain events is another topic that should be explored. 
There appears to be a relationship between Zadeh's Fuzzy Sets64 and 
I. J. Good's concept of second order probabi1ity.65 If the suspicion 
is verified, then a set of axiomatic principles may be developed similar 
to the Ko1mogorov axioms of probability. With such a foundation, the 
potential of Fuzzy Sets as an instrument for measuring and expressing 
imprecision is virtually unlimited. This would be especially useful 
for handling complex systems, e.g., biological and behavioral systems. 
Finally, the approach shows the advantage of structuring an 
inquiry process through the use of knowledge states and provides 
some parameter for generating and selecting them. The model itself, 
however, does not provide guidelines for generating either the minimal 
nor the maximal number of knowledge states or decisional alternatives. 
64L. A. Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets," Informaton and Control 8 (1965): 
p. 338-353. 
65 1. J. Good, "SubjectlVe Probabil ity as the Measure of a Non-
Measurable set," in Logic, ~1ethodology and Philosophy, eds., Ernest 
Nagel, Patrick Suppes, and Alfred Tarski (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1962): p. 319-329. 
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ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS 
The model may be further extended to include time-dependent 
primary events fw(t) j. Further research is required, however, before 
such a model can be developed. In such situations, the redundant and/ 
or marginal effects over time must be considered, that is Ew(t)J may 
not be a disjoint set. Also the problem of non-stationarity will have 
to be investigated. 
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APPENDIX A 
SOME DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 
Inference: The concept of inference is basic to Bayesian analysis. 
Savage in his book, Statistical Inference, states the following: 
"By inference I mean roughly how we find things out--whether 
with a view to using new knowledge as a basis for explicit action 
or not--and how it comes to pass that we often acquire practically 
identical opinions in the light of evidence. Statistical 
inference is not the whole of inference but a special kind." 66 
Another definition is due to Jamison. "We might distinguish 
between inductive and deductive inferences in the following way: 
Deductive inferences refer to the implications of coherence for 
a given set of belief, whereas inductive inferences follow from 
conditions for 'rational' change in belief."67 
Throughout this thesis I used the following definition, which 
is more concise than the above: Inference is a process using 
empirical evidences, experiences, etc., to draw a conclusion. 
66L. J. Savage, Statistical Inference (Great Britain: Spottiswoode 
Ballantyne & Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 11. 
67D. Jamison, "Bayesian Information Usage," p. 29. 
Cascaded Inference: It is an indirect approach to inference and is 
often called hierarchical, cascaded or multiple-stage inference 
(see figure 5). In multiple-stage inference, the process is 
decomposed into a series of steps or stages, where at each step 
the assessor focuses only on that portion of the hierarchy. 
The output of the previous step or stages becomes the input to 
the next stage. 
67 
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APPENDIX B 
COMPUTER PROGRAM 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
INPUT DATA 
CALCULATED RESULTS 
1 REM ****************************** 
3 REM * A BAYESIAN MODEL * 
5 REM * * 
7 REM * HEWLETT-PACKARD * 
9 REM * BASIC 2S00/F * 
11 REM * JAN. 1976 * 
13 REM ****************************** 
15 DIM FC4"Un"CC10"101"GCI01"TC4"ISl,,UCI0,,41 
17 DIM HC4" 101"PC41"RC91"AC un"Bt 10J"YC U!ll"NC91 
19 RCl1=280 
21 Rt21=595 
23 RC31=955 
25 Rt41=1375 
27 RC 51= 1879 
29 Rt 61= 2509 
31 Rt71=3349 
33 Rt81=4609 
35 RC91=7129 
37 MAT A=ZER 
39 MAT B=ZER 
41 MAT U=ZER 
43 MAT T=ZER 
45 MAT P=ZER 
47 N2= 1 
49 N 1= 1 
51 MAT READ YC10] 
53 MAT READ NC9] 
55 READ AI" A2 
57 FOR 1= 1 TO 9 
59 K=NC I 1 
61 ACI1=RCK] 
63 NEXT I 
65 5=0 
67 FOR J= 1 TO 9 
69 S=S+ACJl 
71 NEXT J 
73 R= (A2-Al> IS 
75 FOR 1.=1 TO 9 
77 K=1.+ 1 
79 BCK1=ACL1*R 
81 NEXT 1. 
83 AC 11=Al 
85 FOR 1=2 TO 10 
87 J=I-l 
89 ACI1=ACJ1+BtI] 
91 NEXT I 
93 5=0 
70 
95 FOR J=l TO 10 
97 S=AtJJ+S 
99 NEXT J 
101 R= lIS 
103 FOR K=1 TO 10 
105 ACKJ=AtKJ*R 
107 NEXT K 
109 FOR 1 = 1 TO 10 
111 J=YtIJ 
113 BCIJ=AtJJ 
115 NEXT 1 
117 IF Nl=1 THEN 147 
119 IF Nl=999 mEN 131 
121 FOR 1=1 TO 10 
123 GCIJ=BCIJ 
125 NEXT 1 
127 Nl=999 
129 GOTO 51 
131 I=N2 
133 FOR J=1 TO 10 
135 Tt 1, JJ=BCJJ 
137 U(J,IJ=BtJJ 
139 NEXT J 
141 N2=N2+1 
143 I F N 2< 5 THEN 51 
145 GOTO 179 
147 N 1=2 
149 PRINT" **** INITIAL ALPHAS ****" 
151 MAT PRINT B 
153 MAT READ H 
155 FOR 1=1 TO 4 
157 FOR J=1 TO 10 
159 PCIJ=PCll+HCI,Jl*BCJJ 
161 NEXT J 
163 NEXT I 
165 PRINT II U 
167 PRINT "FIRST ROUND RESUt.TS" 
169 PRINT PCIJ,P[2J,Pt3J,PC4J 
171 S=PC11+PC2J+P[3]+PC4J 
173 PRINT "CHECK ON SUM "5 
17 5 PR I NT" " 
177 GOTO 51 
179 REM ****** CHECK COHERENCY ****** 
181 FOR J=1 TO 10 
183 5=0 
185 FOR 1=1 TO 4 
71 
187 S=UCJ" 1 l*P[ 1 l+S 
189 NEXT I 
191 BtJ]=S 
193 NEXT J 
195 MAT C=ZER 
197 FOR 1=1 TO 10 
199 CtI,,11=I/BCI1 
201 NEXT I 
203 MAT D=ZER 
205 FOR 1=1 TO 4 
207 DCI,,11=PCIl 
209 NEXT 1 
211 S=0 
213 FOR K=1 TO 4 
215 FOR 1=1 TO 10 
217 FOR J=1 TO 4 
219 S=DCK"J1*TCJ"IJ+S 
221 NEXT J 
223 HCK" 1 ]=S 
225 S=0 
227 NEXT 1 
229 NEXT K 
231 S=0 
233 FOR K=1 TO 4 
235 FOR 1=1 TO 10 
237 FOR J=1 TO 10 
239 S=HCK"JJ*CCJ"I1+S 
241 NEXT J 
243 FCK" 1]= S 
245 S=0 
247 NEXT 1 
249 NEXT K 
251 FOR K=1 TO 4 
253 S=0 
255 FOR 1=1 TO 10 
257 S=S+FCK"Il*GCll 
259 NEXT I 
261 ACK]=S 
263 NEXT K 
265 PRINT" **** REVI SED ALPHAS ****" 
267 MAT PRINT G 
269 PRINT .... 
271 PRINT "SECOND ROUND RESUI..TS" 
273 PRINT ACll"AC21"At31"AC4] 
275 S=AC11+At21+AC3]+AC4] 
277 PRINT" CHECK ON SUM "s 
279 REM ***** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
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QUESTIONNAIRES 
INPUT DATA 
CALCULATED RESULTS 
73 
On the basis of your experiences and knowledge about Oregon, in 
particular the in-migration problem and the resulting demographic 
changes, please give your opinions on the following alternative actions 
being considered to ensure a future "livable Oregon,') that is a situa-
tion where population is balanced with environmental factors. 
Legislation to attract industry, capital and revenue 
to the state. 
H2 Legislation to discourage in-migration, i.e., residence 
requirements for public education and state-sponsored 
social services. 
H3 Research to find ways and means to preserve or improve 
the quality of life with the expected growth. 
H4 No action until the in-migration problem is understood 
fully. 
ROUND 1 
Please give your opinions on the above alternatives, that is, your 
probability estimates for each of the actions to ensure a IIlivable 
Oregon. II 
ROUND 2 
Please reconsider your initial estimates for Hl , H2, H3, and H4. 
below are the median values given by the panel. 
Your initial estimates: 
r'1edi an: 
Your revised estimates: 
74 
Li sted 
Due to the continuance of in-migration and resulting demographic 
changes, the following ten states may occur in Oregon. 
Continued suburban sprawl, similar to what we have today. 
Urbanization, with people moving back into the cities due to 
various factors such as energy shortages and the convenience 
of downtown. 
75 
New population centers developing near local energy sources. 
Changes in attitudes, such as the continued acceptances of 
birth control and emphasis on zero population growth, reducing 
the projected growth by as much as 15%. 
;(5 r·linimal net in-migration because of taxes and environmental 
control measures such as limiting density and land usages. 
Technological breakthrough so that energy will be a factor 
contributing to growth. 
017 In-migration problem being short term, because most of the people moving into Oregon are either retired or will be 
retiring shortly, and so will die in about 10 years. 
0(3 An increase in pressure for more social services for both 
the young and old. 
0(9 Population growth stabilizing due to limited resources, jobs, etc. 
Oregon1s becoming a mecca for new development similar to 
California in the 1950 to 1960 1s. 
76 
ROUND 1 
Please give your opinions on the defined set of knowledge states. 
I. Please rank the o(ils (from 1 to 10) in ascending order of 
occurrence, that is, rank the states in the order that you feel 
will most likely occur. 
States: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
II. Arrange your ranked o(ils~ starting with the least likely (rank of 
1) to the most likely (rank of 10). Now consider the arranged 
10 
~i IS in successive pairs and rank their differences. The ranking 
is from 1 to 9, with a rank value 1 denoting the smallest difference 
and a value 9 for the largest difference. 
Ranked States: 
Ranking of 
Differences, 
Pa i r-vli se: 
Ill. Give probability values for your least and most likely estimates, 
that is, the oIi IS you assigned ranks 1 and 10 in 1. __ 
IV. Please give conditional probability estimates for each H·. 
J 
II If d i occurs, what are your estimates for H.?" J 
2 
3 ---
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ROUND 2 
In light of what you have learned or did not consider earlier, please 
recons; der the ~i IS. 
77 
I. Pl ease rank the 0(; I S (from 1 tp 10) ; n ascendi ng order of occur-
rence, that is, rank the states in the order that you feel will 
most likely occur. 
States: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
78 
II. Arrange your ranked o(i1s, starting with the least likely (rank 
of 1) to the most likely (rank of 10). Now consider the arranged 
o(ils in successive pairs and rank their differences. The rank-
ing is from 1 to 9, with a rank value 1 denoting the smallest 
difference and a value 9 for the largest difference. 
Ranked States: 
Ranking of 
Differences, 
Pair-wise: 
III. Give probability values for your least and most likely estimates, 
that is, the o(ils you assigned ranks 1 and 10 in I. 
Consider the conditionality of the ~ils, that is, given that alternative 
Hj ;s enacted, please rank the o(i IS in ascending order of occurrence. 
A. If Hl (Legislation to attract industry, capital and revenue 
to the state) is enacted, how would you rank the o(ils? 
I. Please rank the o(ils (from 1 to 10) in ascending order of occur-
rence, that is, rank the states in the order that you feel will 
most likely occur. 
States: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
79 
II. Arrange your ranked o(ils, starting with the least likely (rank 
of 1) to the most likely (rank of 10). Now consider the arranged 
~ils in successive pairs and rank their differences. The rank-
ing is from 1 to 9, with a rank value 1 denoting the smallest 
difference and a value 9 for the largest difference. 
Ranked States: 
Ranki ng of 
Differences, 
Pa i r-\'1i se: 
III. Give probability values for your least and most likely estimates, 
that is, the P(ils you assigned ranks 1 and 10 in I. 
B. If H2 (Legislation to discourage in-migration, i.e., residence 
requirements for public education and state sponsored social 
services) is enacted, how would you rank the o(i IS. 
I. Please rank the 0( i IS (from 1 to 10) in ascending order of occur-
rence, that is, rank the states in the order that you feel will 
most likely occur. 
States: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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II. Arrange your ranked &(i 's, starting with the least likely (rank 
of 1) to the most likely (rank of 10). Now consider the arranged 
P(i's in successive pairs and rank their differences. The rank-
ing is from 1 to 9, with a rank value 1 denoting the smallest 
difference and a value 9 for the largest difference. 
Ranked States: 
Ranking of 
Differences, 
Pair-wise: 
III. Give probability values for your least and most likely estimates, 
that is, the o(.IS you assigned ranks 1 and 10 in 1. , 
1. 
C. If H3 (Initiate research to find ways and means to preserve 
or improve the quality of life with the expected growth) 
is enacted, hO~J would you rank the &(i IS? 
Please rank the ~.IS (from 1 to 10) in ascending order of occur-
1 
renee, that is, rank the states in the order that you feel will 
most likely occur. 
States: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 
II. Arrange your ranked of. IS, starting with the least likely (rank 
1 
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of 1) to the most likely (rank of 10). Now consider the arranged 
o(i IS in successive pairs and rank their differences. The ranking 
is from 1 to 9, with a rank value 1 denoting the smallest differ-
ence and a value 9 for the largest difference. 
Ranked States: 
Ranking of 
Differences, 
Pair-wise: 
III. Give probability values for your least and most likely estimates, 
that is, the 0(. IS you assigned ranks 1 and 10 in I. 
1 
D. If H4 (No action until the in-migration problem is understood 
fully) is enacted, how would you rank the 0<; IS? 
I. Please rank the O<ils (from 1 to 10) in ascending order of occur-
rence, that is, rank the states in the order that you feel will 
most likely occur. 
States: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
II. Arrange your ranked ~. IS, starting with the least likely (rank 
1 
of 1) to the most likely (rank of 10). Now consider the arranged 
o(ils in successive pairs and rank their differences. The ranking 
is from 1 to 9, with a rank value 1 denoting the smallest differ-
ence and a value 9 for the largest difference. 
Ranked States: 
Ranking of 
Differences, 
Pair-wise: 
82 
III. Give probability values for your least and most likely estimates, 
that is, the t:(i's you assigned ranks 1 and 10 in 1. 
Input format: 
Round 1: a. Initial alpha estimates. 
b. Initial H estimates. 
Round 2: o. Revised alpha estimates. 
b. Conditional alpha estimates. 
83 
681 
686 
691 
696 
701 
706 
711 
716 
721 
726 
731 
736 
741 
746 
751 
756 
761 
766 
771 
776 
781 
786 
791 
796 
696 
701 
706 
711 
716 
721 
726 
731 
736 
741 
746 
751 
756 
761 
766 
771 
776 
781 
786 
791 
796 
8"1 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
** G. B. ** 
***** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
1 "" 1" 6, 7" 3" 4" 2" 5" 8" 9 
9,8" 7" lb 5" 6" 2, 1,3 
.08, .9 
.2, • 25, .7" 0" • 5, • 8" • 8" • 7" • 5, 0 
.05".25,0,.6".3" 0,.05".2" 0".8 
• 5" • 2 5" • 2 5, • 4" • 2" • 2" • 1, • 1" • 5" 0 
• 25,.25".05,0" 0" 0, • 05" 0" 0, • 2 
**** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES **** 
10" 2, 7" 6, 3, 4" 1, 8" 5" 9 
9, 7,4, 2" 8, 6" 5, 1" 3 
• 08, • 9 
10" 8" 7" 4, 2" 3, 1" 5 .. 6, 9 
9" 8" 2" 4" 7, 3" 5" 6 .. 1 
• "6, .85 
6,3,,8,4,9,,~2, 10,7, 1 
8" 7,9,4" 7,5" 1" 2" 3 
• 03" • 9 
9" 5" 8, 6" 2, 3" 1" 7" 4 .. 10 
9" 8" 5,7,4, 6, 3" 2" 1 
.07, .8 
10,8" 4" 7" 5" 3" 1" 9 .. 6" 2 
8 .. 6" 1" 3,4" 7" 5 .. 9" 2 
• 03" • 9 
** R. L. ** 
**** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
5" 9" 6" 4, 2,7, 1, 10" 3,8 
7 ~ 6~ 5- 8" 1 s 4" 3,9, 2 
• 1, .9 
• 7" • 1" • 5" • 5" • 3, • 6" • 2 5" • 1" • 1" • 7 
• 1, • 2" • 3, • 2" • 6" • 1, • 2 5, • 5" • 7" • 0 5 
• 1".5". 15,. 1".05".2,.25".3". 1" • 2 
• 1" • 4, • 05" • 2, • 0 5" • 1" • 2 5" • 1, • 1" • 0 5 
**** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES **** 
3,9" 8,2" 7" 5,1" 10" 6" 4 
2, 6" 1, 3, 9" 5, 7" 8" 4 
• 1".9 
9" 2,8" 5" 6,7,4" 3" I" 10 
1" 6" 8, 3,7,9" 5" 4" 2 
• 4" • 6 
3" 10~ 4" 6" 7" 1,8,9" 5" 2 
2,,~~9,7,,8,4,,1,3 
• 35" .65 
3" 9" 8" 2,7,4" 1" 10" 5" 6 
1,5",2,6,3,7" 8" 9, 4 
• 1, .9 
3" 9" 7" 2,8, 6" 1" 10" 4" 5 
806 DATA 2,,5,,7;9;1;8;6;3;4 
811 DATA .15".85 
84 
55C1J 
60C1J 
61C1J 
615 
62C1J 
625 
63C1J 
635 
64C1J 
645 
65C1J 
655 
66C1J 
665 
67C1J 
675 
68CiJ 
685 
69CiJ 
695 
7C1J0 
7C1J5 
71C1J 
715 
550 
6CiJC1J 
6C1J5 
61C1J 
615 
620 
625 
63C1J 
64f2J 
645 
65f2J 
655 
66C1J 
665 
67 C1J 
675 
680 
685 
69C1J 
695 
700 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
** P. M. ** 
***** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
IC1J .. 2 .. 7 .. 1 .. 4 .. 5 .. 3 .. 9 .. 6 .. 8 
9 .. 2 .. 7,8, I .. 4 .. 3 .. 5 .. 6 
• C1J5 ... 5 
• C1J 7 ... 2 ... 4.. • I ... C1J 5 ... 5 ... I ... 7 ... 2 ... 5 
• 6 ... 7 ... L&I • 2 ... 8 ... I ... 4, • I ... 2 ... 3 
• C1J 3, • 01.. • I, • I ... C1J 5 ... 2 ... I ... CiJ 1, • C1J 5, • 05 
• 3, • C1J9 ... I ... 6 ... 1, • 2 ... 4 ... 19 ... 55, • I 5 
***** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES ***** 
I C1J .. 6 .. 7 .. 2 .. 4 .. 1, 3 .. 9 .. 5, 8 
9 .. 3,8 .. 2 .. 7 .. 6, 5, 4, 1 
• C1J3,. 63 
IC1J .. 5 .. 7 .. 1 .. 2 .. 6,4 .. 9 .. 3 .. 8 
1 .. 4 .. 5 .. 7 .. 3 .. 8 .. 6 .. 9 .. 2 
.03 ... 5 
10 .. 5 .. 4 .. 3 .. 8 .. I .. 2 .. 9 .. 7 .. 6 
9 .. 2 .. 3 .. 8 .. 7 .. 5 .. 6, 4 .. I 
.01 ... 65 
1 0 .. 9 .. 7 .. 3 .. 2 .. 8 .. 4 .. I .. 5, 6 
2 .. 3 .. 6 .. 9 .. 4, 8 .. 7, 5 .. 1 
.25 ... 3 
1 0 .. 7 .. 6 .. 2 .. 3, I .. 4 .. 9 .. 5, 8 
2 .. 7 .. 5, 6 .. 8 .. 9,4 .. 3 .. 1 
.05,. 6 
** T. P. ** 
***** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
9 .. 2 .. 1 .. 3 .. 7 .. 8 .. 1 .. lC1J,4,5 
2 .. 3 .. 4 .. 5 .. 8 .. 91 3 .. 2" 1 
.05 ... 9 
C1J .. 0 ... 3 .. 0 .. f2J ... 2 .. 0 ... I .. 0, 0 
• I ... 2 .. 0 .. 0 .. 0, 0 .. 0 ... 3 .. C1J ... 4 
• 7 ... 6 ... 2, C1J, 1 ... 7 .. C1J1 • 5 .. 0 ... 6 
• 2 ... 2, • 5.. I .. C1J ... 1, I ... I, I .. C1J 
****** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES ***** 
1 C1J .. 3 .. 4 .. 2 .. 5 .. 6 .. I .. 8 .. 7,9 
3 .. 21 2 .. 5 .. 3 .. 6 .. 8 .. 2 .. 1 
.05 .. 1 
1 0 .. 7, 5 .. 3 .. 2 .. 8.. 1 .. 9 .. 41 6 
4 .. 2 .. 3 .. 6 .. 5 .. 5 .. 8 .. 3 .. 1 
CiJ .. 1 
10 .. 8 .. 5 .. 21 3 .. 6 .. I .. 9 .. 71 4 
1,3 .. 5 .. 6 .. 2, 8 .. I .. 4 .. 2 
0 ... 7 
10,4 .. 3 .. 2 .. 5, 61 I .. 8,3 .. 9 
I .. 2 .. 3 .. 3 .. 2, 4,9 .. I .. 1 
• 05 ... 95 
7"4 DATA! 9; 2; 7 ~ 3~ b.~ 58 lo!' 6" 6" 9 
7C1J5 DATA 3 .. 4,5,2, 11217121 1 
7 1 0 DA TA ." 5, 1 
85 
55~ 
60~ 
60S 
61121 
615 
62121 
625 
639 
64121 
645 
650 
655 
660 
665 
670 
675 
680 
685 
690 
695 
71210 
71115 
710 
715 
550 
61210 
605 
610 
615 
620 
621 
625 
640 
645 
650 
655 
66121 
665 
670 
675 
680 
685 
690 
695 
700 
71121 
715 
72121 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
REM 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
** D. S. ** 
***** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
1121,,8,,6,,2,,5,,4,,1,,9,,7,,3 
6" 2" I" 9" 8" 7" 5" 3" 4 
• 65" • 2" • 6" • 5" • 1 5" • 3" • 3 5" • I" • 3" • 4 
• I" • 2" • I" • 0 5" • 4" • 1 5" • 3 5" • 6" • 3" • 1 
• 2" • 4" • 2 5" • 3" • 4" • 1 5" • 1 5" • 2" • 3" • 2 5 
• 0 5" • 2" • 121 5" • 1 5" • 1215" • 4" • 1 5" • I" • I" • 2 5 
***** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES ****** 
10" 8" 7" 2" 5" 3" I" 9" 6" 4 
4" 7" 9" 8" 5" 6" 2" 3" 1 
• 05".65 
9" 3" 7 " 4" 5" 6" I" 8" 2" 1 0 
9" 6" I" 2" 7"8,, 5" 4" 3 
• 05" • 7 
6" 9" 4" 3" 8" 2" I" 10" 7" 5 
7" 2" 5" 6" 3" 4" I" 8" 9 
• 05".95 
4" 9" 7" 5" 6" 3" I" Ie" 8" 2 
2,,1,,9,,6,,8,,7,,3,,5,,4 
.1215,,·7 
Ie" 7" 5" 2" 3" 6" I" 8" 4" 9 
4,,9,,7,,1,,3,,8,,6,,5,,2 
• 1215" .95 
** E. W. ** 
***** INPUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ***** 
5" I" 8" 6" 4" 9 .. 2" 7 .. 3" 1 0 
I" 7" 5" 9" 6" 4 .. 8 .. 3,2 
.1212".8 
• 9" • 57" • 5" • 3" • 3" • 9 ... 3" • 9" • 8 ... 6 
c 07 ~ c 4" c 4 7 ~ c 4" e 6" e 07" e 4, • f!J 6, • 1" • 3 
• 02" • 1212" • 02 ... 2" • 06" • 1212" • 2" • 1213" • 1216" • 1216 
• 01" • 1211" • 1211 ... 1" • 04 ... 1211 ... 1 ... 1211" • 1214" • 1214 
****** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES ***** 
7 .. 5,,8 .. 1,,2,,9 .. 4 .. 6,,3 .. 10 
3" 2 .. 4 .. 5" 7 .. 8" 6" 9" 1 
• 1".9 
Ie" 6" 7 .. 3" 1 .. 5 .. 2" 8 .. 4" 9 
7" 3,,9 .. 8 .. 5" 6"4,,2,, 1 
• 1 ... 9 
6 .. 4,,6,,8,,5,,3 .. 1 .. 9,,2,,7 
9 .. 6" 2" 5" 4" 3" 8" 7 .. 1 
• £1"35 ... 95 
9" 1, 8", 3, 5 .. 6" 2" 7 .. 41 10 
9, 6",8",4" 7" 3" 2" 5" 1 
• 1".9 
9" 6,,7 .. 2,1 .. 8,,3,5,4110 
I" 2, 5 .. 6 .. 3 .. 4,7,8,9 
• I", .9 
86 
87 
** w. w. ** 
550 REM *.*** INPUT IN I Tl AI. ESTIMATES ***** 
600 DATA 3" 7" 9" 10" 5" 4" 2" 6" 8" 1 
605 DATA 9,,8,,2,,6,,1,,7,,6,,3,,4 
610 DATA .12,." .99 . "-
61~, DATA • 2" • 6" • 5" • 5" 0" • 5" • 2" • 3" • 5" 1 
620 DATA • I" 0" 0" 0" • 7" 0" • 0 5" 0" • I" 0 
625 DATA • 5" • 3 5" • 5 .. 0" • I" • 5" • I" • 4" .. I" 0 
630 DATA .2".05"0".5".2"0 ... 65,,.3,,.3,,0 
640 REM ****** INPUT REVISED ESTIMATES ***** 
645 DATA 3,,7,,10,,9,,2,,6,,5,,4,,8,,1 
650 DATA 9" 8" 2" I" 7" 3" 6" 4" 5 
655 DATA .01".95 
660 DATA 1101 6" 9" 10" 3" 5" 1,,8 .. 7.1 2 
665 DATA 3,,9,,1,,5,,6,,7,,2,,8,,4 
700 DATA .01".8 
705 DATA 3" 6" 9" 10" 5" 4" 1 .. 7" 8" 2 
710 DATA I" 9" 2" 6" 8" 5" 7 .. 3" 4 
715 DATA .01".99 
720 DATA 3" 7" 9 ... 4" 5" 10" 2 .. 6" 8 .. 1 
725 DATA 5" 9" 3" 7 .. I" 8" 2 .. 4" 6 
730 DATA • 1 ... 9 5 
735 DATA 4" 7" 8" 10 .. 5" 2" 3" 6" 9 .. 1 
740 DATA 9" 2" 8" Lb J" 7" 5 .. 3" 6 
745 DATA • I" • 8 
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Calculated Results 
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** G. B. ** 
**** 
INI TIAL ALPHAS **** 
.140174 
1.24599E-02 
.115741 
.129869 
7.85583E-02 
.097417 
5.26044E-02 
.10516 
.13322 
.134797 
FIRST ROUND RESULTS 
.411686 .243112 .271666 7.35351 E- 02 
CHECK ON SUM 1. 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
• 149499 
5.61036E-02 
• 130797 
• 115726 
7.62167E-02 
8.44746E-02 
1.32888 E- 02 
.142081 
.086048 
.143763 
SECOND ROUND RESULTS 
.4i i436 .238223 .. 277985 7 e 23549 E- 02 
CHECK ON SUM 1 
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** R. L. ** 
**** INITIAL ALPHAS **** 
.105432 
.17307 
• 107377 
7.34226E-02 
.042946 
.116926 
1 • 9 669 1 E- 02 
.177202 
6.03731E-02 
.123559 
FIRST ROUND RESULTS 
.379721 .271479 .234692 • 146522 
CHECK ON SUM 1.03461 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
4. 74 1 03 E- 02 
.192707 
.155914 
2.73613E-02 
.129179 
5.72692E-02 
2. 26315E- 02 
.203663 
.114179 
4.96455E-02 
SECOND ROUND RESULTS 
.325667 ~249646 .266236 • 156051 
CHECK ON SUM 1. 
**** INITIAL ALPHAS **** 
.156279 
.123144 
.112881 
• 14QJ719 
.114617 
• 129QJ67 
FIRST ROUND RESULTS 
.326696 .367891 
CHECK ON SUM 1. 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
.154214 
.115QJ81 
.131328 
5" 35092E-1.?J2 
8. 95403E- 02 
7.34351E-03 
5.96936E-02 
• 1524QJl 
9.33934E-QJ2 
.143496 
SECOND ROUND RESUI..TS 
.303434 .38704 
CHECK ON SUM 1. 
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** P. M. ** 
6. 58992E- 02 .239514 
6.63591 E- 02 w 243167 
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** T. P. ** 
**** 
INI TIAL ALPHAS **** 
• 1911'589 
1. 6657 6E-11'2 
1. 11'7429 E-11'2 
2. 615~9E-~2 
.175181 
.184674 
:.11'7429E-11'2 
.193372 
3. 98193E-~2 
5.84978E-11'2 
FI RST ROUN D RESUL TS 
.11'59495 • 1~38~1 .581794 .161339 
CHECK ON SUM .9~6429 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
.211'7742 
3.39686E-11'2 
4·311'2e19E-el2 
2. 49161:E- (212 
7. 16078E-02 
8.61371 E-11'2 
1.11'3871E-11'2 
.19443 
• 124311'9 
• 2~3482 
SECOND ROUND RESUl.TS 
6.39216E-11'2 .1255,,1 .6i2634 .197743 
CHECK ON SUM 1 
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** D. s. ** 
**** IN 1 TIAL ALPHAS **** 
.181835 
• 164399 
0125279 
3.08969E-02 
.121912179 
3.7 4444E- 02 
1.21223E-02 
.171546 
• 15121339 
3.53492E-02 
FIRST ROUND RESULTS 
.347179 .262875 .274715 • 1152~H 
CHECK ON SUM 1. 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
.154499 
.146733 
.142992 
2. !2l53!2l7E-12I2 
.1154 
4. 1589 6E-12I2 
1. 18845E-12I2 
.152738 
• 127215 
8.64176E-12I2 
SECOND ROUND RESULTS 
.336512 .264211 .. 282127 e!!715 
CHECK ON SUM 1. 
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** E. W. ** 
**** 
INITIAL. ALPHAS **** 
.1(35385 
4.63631 E-(33 
.173(395 
.125388 
4.85488E-C2J2 
.18(37"9 
6.868 6"E- (33 
.13635 
3.35f35E-"2 
.185452 
FIRST ROUND RESULTS 
.661757 • 252441 5. 58724E-(32 2.993(31E-02 
CHECK ON SUM 1 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
.13"138 
.(363738 
• 151 (372 
2g365l!6E-!2I2 
3.16229E-"2 
.21"555 
4.8(36(31 E- (32 
9.16813E-(32 
3.6587 4E- (32 
.212891 
SECOND ROUND RESULTS 
.694567 .21019 6.00075 E- e2 3052356'£- r;,2 
CHECK O~ SUM 1 
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** w. w. ** 
**** INITIAL ALPHAS **** 
8. rlJ7877E-rlJ2 
.126208 
.149576 
.158851 
.101727 
8. 46rlJ 15E-02 
4.96959E-02 
.103616 
.143133 
1.60456E-03 
FIRST ROUND RESULTS 
.402691 9.60657E-02 .272657 .228566 
CHECK ON SUM 1 
**** REVISED ALPHAS **** 
6.43541E-02 
• 120623 
.161404 
• 146173 
5. 16991E-02 
.114096 
9.05156E-02 
6.65439E-02 
• 13649 
1.69699E-03 
SECOi-lD ROUND RESt.'!. TS 
.37944 6.99711E-02 .276095 .252494 
CHECK ON SUM 1 
APPENDIX C 
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE 
For the purpose of illustrating the formal features not used 
in the migration problem (chapter V), a hypothetical example is pre-
sented. In this exercise, we demonstrate the use of type II 
probability in the revision phase of feedback and show that aggre-
gation can be performed in each stage, which generally would not be 
done in a real problem. We also assumed the lognormal properties 
of human responses and thereby used a multiplicative aggregation 
procedure. 
Commercial fishing is a major industry in the Western states. 
The viability of the industry affects both domestic and foreign 
economic policies. In recent years, commercial fishing has gone through 
a series of economic difficulties. Because of its importance a policy 
analyst has been asked to investigate probable changes (hypotheses) 
in existing policies to ensure the viability of the industry. 
Since it was not possible to derive 3 distribution for the 
primary event w, a direct line of reasoning was ruled out. Therefore 
the analyst decided to assess the situation by means of an indirect 
method, in this case a cascaded process. Such a structured (cascaded) 
process permits the analyst to gather information on intermediate 
events (knowledge states) which he feels are relevant to the issue. 
In addition to providing more information, this process aids the 
assessors to focus on specific events. 
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Thus the cascading process structures the inference path for the 
assessors and provides the kind of information desired by the analyst. 
Suppose that two experts have been asked to assess the following 
hypotheses (assumed to be mutually exclusive, and exhaustive): 
H1: Diplomatic actions to extend U. S. fishing zone to 50 miles. 
H2: Aids in the form of federal subsidy to the fishing industry. 
Three causal states (knowledge states) are assumed. These are taken 
to be mutually exclusive and one of them occurs. 
0(1: Foreign competitions have taken big catches off the U. S. coast. 
0(2: Recent court actions giving unlimited fishing rights to 
native Americans will sharply disrupt the natural reproduction 
of the species. 
0(3: The market price has not kept up with the rising cost of 
the industry. 
It is assumed that the above causal states were the results of the 
following primary event: 
w: Some empirical records are available, i.e., mortality rates 
of the species, feeding ranges, etc., but they are incomplete. 
Some experimental data on hybrids is available, e.g. the hybrid 
type, "super salmon," developed at the University of 
Washington. 
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The assessors were asked to give estimates on P(H,lw) and P(H2\w). Since 
w is incomplete and additional substantive data is unavailable, Bayes I 
theorem is not applicable. The proposed algorithm circumvents this 
problem by using the estimates P(~Jw) as input. 
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STAGE 1 
Each assessor is asked to estimate P( rJ lw), hence P{ 0( 1 \w), 
P(ol2lw) and P{ti3Iw). Their responses are shown in figures 6,7,8 
and 9 (not drawn exactly to scale). Figure 6 is assessor 1 's responses 
for Pl(<<lw) along with the underlying distributions for each of the 
Pl { o(i1w). The responses for assessor 2 are shown in figure 7. 
Each assessor then receives the other expert's initial PDF. He 
is asked to give a credibility function of his initial estimates. The 
credibility function is a IImeasure of preciseness ll for each estimate 
P{diJW)'. Each assessor's credibility function, CRDF, is shown in 
figures 8 and 9. The higher the credibility value, the smaller the 
fuzzy interval, hence a sharper and more precise estimate of the 
corresponding P( o(lw). , 
A revised PDF is derived from the credibility estimate. 68 
revi sed P k ( oil w) :: C· CRDF (b) b, k :: 1,2 (24) 
where b :: Pk{ ~Iw); and C is a constant. The revised PDFs for assessors 
1 and 2 are shown in table VII. A high credibility value implies a 
high degree of precision or less fuzziness, hence the interval (x to y) 
is narrow. 69 A low CRDF value indicates fuzziness and the corresponding 
68In this discrete example, we use the following 
Pk(o(il w) :: CRDF(bi)bi k:: 1,2 (25) 
)" CRDF(bj)b j J~l ' 
69There is an underlying distribution for each P{ d i ) where x to y 
is a likelihood interval. If the assessor feels that there is an increase 
in precision, then the new interval x' to y' will be less than x to y, 
hence Ix'-y'l< Ix-yl. On the other hand, an increase in fuzziness will 
have /x'-y'/ > lx-yr· 
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1 
• • • • 
• 
• 
P(3 
.4 1 
.5 1 
.1 1 
Figure 6. Initial estimates (Assessor 1). 
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1 
•• 
P2{.,(lw) 
• 
. 
. 
. 
. 
• • 
. 
. 
. 
0(1 «2 ~3 
.6 1 
.3 1 
.1 1 
Figure 7. Initial estimates (Assessor 2). 
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Figure 8. Revised estimates (Assessor 1). 
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Figure 9. Revised estimates (Assessor 2). 
Initial 
P(o(1(W) .4 
P(o(2fw) .5 
P(o(3I w) .1 
TABLE VI I 
REVISED STAGE 1 ESTIMATES 
Assessor 1 Assessor 2 
CRDF 
.43 
.14 
.36 
Revised Initial 
.619 .6 
.252 .3 
.129 .1 
Aggregated Estimates 
p a (~'\' w) = .925 
p a ~ 2 ,w) = .033 
Pa(,(3!w) = .043 
CRDF 
.40 
.07 
.53 
104 
Revised 
.764 
.067 
.169 
distribution is diffuse, hence the slightest adjustment due to CRDF 
is reflected in the revised PDF. For example, assessor 21 s initial 
estimate of el2 is P2( o(2/w) = b2 = .5, with CRDF (b2) = .07 and this 
leads to a revised b2 = .06. Thus, the relative change on vi2 is 
maximum due to the corresponding CRDF estimate, which is the lowest 
of the three values. 
The two revised PDFs may now be aggregated. 70 
(26) 
These results are necessary and are the inputs for the next stage 
(see Table VII). 
STAGE 2 
Each assessor is now asked to estimate the unknown P(Hl Ie(i) 
105 
and P(H2/~i). As in stage 1, each assessor is asked to give an 
initial PDF, Pk(H.lol). Since he is working with only two alternatives, 
J 
a credibility measure is not needed. Each assessor is asked to reassess 
his previous estimated directly. Their initial and revised results are 
shown in tables VIII and IX. Their aggregated results are listed 
in table X. 
70Since there are only 3 pOints, the following approximation 
procedure was used, 
Pl (~ilw)P2( '" il w) 
PaC d;lw) = ---------, for each I Pl ( t:<'i 1w )P2( «';Iw) 
(27) 
1 
TABLE VIII 
STAGE 2 ESTIMATES (ASSESSOR 1) 
Given: P( H11«;) P(H 2/d;) til .429 .571 
~2 .714 .286 
0(3 .791 .209 
TABLE IX 
STAGE 2 ESTIMATES (ASSESSOR 2) 
Given: P(HIJ~ ) P(H2'~) 
~ .451 .545 
«'2 .600 .400 
r;(3 .666 .333 
TABLE X 
AGGREGATED RESULTS 
Pa (H 11"'i) = .383 Pa(H21~) = 
Pa(Hl'~) = .789 Pa(H21~) = 
P a (H 11 t(3) = .882 Pa (H 3 1'3) = 
106 
.616 
.227 
.117 
Using the aggregated results from stages 1 and 2, the estimates 
for P(Hjlw) may now be calculated by equation (15). The results are, 
P(H l , w) = .418 
P(H21 w) = .582 
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A trace of the inference tree (figure 10) shows that both assessors 
consider ~l' foreign competition, to be the most important factor which 
could effectively lead to changes in existing policies. 
Table VII shows that ~l is dominant over P(2 and ~3' The effect 
of cI, on hypotheses Hl and H2 is shown in tables VIII and IX. A con-
ventional approach, such as Delphi, to the above problem would not have 
revealed as much information as the proposed approach. 
These estimates should be of considerable use to the decision-
maker. Generally, he will use this information along with other criteria 
to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. For 
instance, option Hl is to extend the territorial zone to 50 miles. This 
will relieve some of the economic pressure on the fishing industry, but 
the U. S. early warning defense system was designed to operate at the 
present three-mile limit. On the other hand, the second option H2 to 
provide federal subsidies to the industry is only a short term solution. 
These and other ramifications to both domestic and foreign policies must 
be assessed by the decision-maker. 
Alternatively, the decision-maker could extend the inquiry by 
means of an additional stage. The results from the previous exercise 
become the starting point of the extended inquiry. In the above 
w 
1 , _____ 
" " -- ---'::'83 
" -........ 
, -- HI 
_ '~.78V 
_____ ,/.882 2--_ /", 
- 7 __ ,.475 
- " / - H .227 _ 2 
-/- __ -- .117 
3 -
P(~\w) = r Pa(o(ilw)Pa(Hjl"i) 
i 
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.418 
.582 
The subscript la l denotes aggregated estimates. 
Figure 10. Inference tree. 
example, the incremental addition could be a set of knowledge states 
which might include the knowledge of foreign trade policies, the U. s. 
economy, dietary preference, etc. The benefit of more information 
will not be without cost. 
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APPENDIX D 
A RULE FOR THE NUMBER OF STAGES TO BE EMPLOYED 
Cascading improves the accuracy of subjective estimates. There 
remains the question of the number of stages to be employed. This is 
a problem for the decision-maker (OM), since the value of the estimates, 
hence information, can only be judged by or" himself. This problem may 
be analyzed as follows: 
Consider the following situation, 
H2 H3 t , 
w ----.. ~ {.Jl---~> If \ . . . 
where the two-stage process, w~(cil---;.H2, has just been completed. 
The value of this information, IH2}, to DM ;s 
EXPECTED V(H2) (28) 
DM must decide whether to employ the third stage, fr~, that is, 
One approach to this problem is to consider the net worth if 
another stage i~ employed. Let 
EXPECTED V(H3) (29) 
be the expected value that can be obtained with the added stage. The 
net gain due to the third stage is 
Net Gain = EXPECTED V(H3) - EXPECTED V(H2} - C(l) (30) 
where C("1) is the cost of adding the third stage. 
MUL TIPlE-STAGE 
A three-stage process is a direct extension of the two-stage 
process developed in chapter V. In a two-stage, the equation is 
I 
P(Hoe I w) = r P( d i Iw)P(H~ I ,(i) (31) 
i 
For three stages, the term P ( Hot I d i) is expanded to 
J 
P(H", J ~i) = L P( Ij fer; )P(~ I OJ) (32) 
j 
Similarly, this step may be expanded for any number of stages. 
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